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Abstract Visual perspective taking research has estab-
lished that chimpanzees recognize what others can or can-
not see in the presence of occluding barriers. Less is known
about chimpanzees’ appreciation of what they themselves
can or cannot see in similar situations. Additionally, it is
unclear whether chimpanzees must rely on others’ gaze
cues to solve such tasks or whether they have a more gen-
eral appreciation of what can be seen from where. Hence,
we investigated chimpanzees’ ability to anticipate what
they would or would not be able to see from diVerent visual
perspectives. Food was hidden among arrays of open con-
tainers, with diVerent containers providing visual access
from unique viewing perspectives. Chimpanzees immedi-
ately adopted the correct perspective for each container
type. Follow-up experiments showed that they were not
simply moving to align themselves with visible openings.
Our study thus suggests that chimpanzees have good visual
perspective taking abilities with regard to themselves as
well as others, and that both likely reXect a more general
knowledge, at least implicit, of what can be seen from
where.
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Introduction
Visual perspective taking in nonhuman animals has
attracted much research attention in recent decades. Investi-
gations have focused mainly on what Flavell (1978) would
describe as Level 1 perspective taking: understanding that
others, like oneself, visually perceive objects and events in
the world around them, and recognizing the conditions
under which they are or are not able to do so. Level 1 per-
spective taking includes, for instance, the knowledge that
others cannot see an object occluded by another opaque
object. Researchers have investigated a variety of abilities
in attempting to discover the precise nature and extent of
visual perspective taking in species spanning several taxa.
At the most basic level, a wealth of studies report gaze fol-
lowing in animals as diverse as dogs (Miklósi et al. 1998),
goats (Kaminski et al. 2005), dolphins (Pack and Herman
2004; Tschudin et al. 2001), ravens (Bugnyar et al. 2004),
and nonhuman primates including all four great apes and a
variety of New and Old world primates (see Tomasello et al.
1998 and reviews in Emery 2000; Gómez 2005; Johnson and
Karin-D’Arcy 2006). Within nonhuman primates, gaze fol-
lowing has been most extensively studied in chimpanzees,
with results clearly indicating that it is not a mere automatic
co-orienting response. Chimpanzees follow gaze past dis-
tracter objects to locations outside of their own visual Weld,
often check back with the gazer when they Wnd nothing inter-
esting at the target location, and discontinue following the
gaze of an individual who repeatedly gazes at nothing
(Bräuer et al. 2005; Call et al. 1998; Itakura 1996; Povinelli
and Eddy 1996, 1997; Tomasello et al. 1999; Tomasello et al.
2001). These behaviors suggest that chimpanzees expect
another’s gaze to have some speciWc external referent, which
they are able to accurately identify by following the gazer’s
imaginary line of sight to its ultimate target destination.
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dence that chimpanzees recognize that opaque objects
impede gaze, an appreciation human children develop
within the Wrst year-and-a-half of life (Butler et al. 2000;
Moll and Tomasello 2004). In a study by Povinelli and
Eddy (1996), for example, when an experimenter looked
toward an opaque partition, chimpanzees rarely followed
her gaze to the back wall of the room where it would have
landed if the partition was absent. More often, they moved
around to look at the other side of the partition, in apparent
recognition that the experimenter’s sight could not project
through and beyond it. Tomasello and colleagues (1999)
obtained similar results in a task involving four visual barri-
ers, each requiring chimpanzees to move to a diVerent loca-
tion in an enclosure to see what an experimenter was gazing
at. Gaze following around barriers has additionally been
observed in other great ape species and ravens (Bräuer et al.
2005; Bugnyar et al. 2004; Schloegl et al. 2007).
Paradigms in which animals must steal or compete for
food have also been used to test for an understanding that
occluders impede visual perception. Hare et al. (2006) found
that chimpanzees more often stole food from a competitive
experimenter when they could approach the food from
behind an opaque barrier, out of the experimenter’s sight. In
another test in which chimpanzees competed with conspe-
ciWcs, subordinates more often approached food that was hid-
den from a dominant’s view by an occluder than food that
was out in the open and clearly visible (Bräuer et al. 2007;
Hare et al. 2000; but see also Karin-D’Arcy and Povinelli
2002). Using this same paradigm, Hare and colleagues
(2003) found no support for the hypothesis that subordinate
capuchin monkeys recognized what dominants could or could
not see. And while common marmosets tested with the same
paradigm preferred food hidden from a dominant’s view by
an occluder, they showed no understanding that an opaque
barrier impeded an experimenter’s gaze (Burkart and Heschl
2007). Finally, while rhesus macaques stole food from a
human competitor who held a visual occluder in front of his
face more often than one who held the occluder in front of his
body (Flombaum and Santos 2005), long-tailed macaques did
not avail themselves of an opaque screen to drink undetected
from a forbidden juice dispenser (Kummer et al. 1996). Once
again, it is interesting that some corvids appear, like apes, to
have a good understanding of how occluders block visual
access. For example, ravens (Bugnyar and Kotrschal 2002)
and scrub-jays (Dally et al. 2005) take advantage of barriers
to cache food out of view of potential pilferers.
The studies described above represent just a small sam-
pling of the extensive research to date investigating visual
perspective taking in a variety of species. In contrast, very
little work has explored animals’ abilities regarding their
own visual experiences. In one rare study, Call and Carpen-
ter (2001) manipulated the visual experiences of chimpan-
zees, orangutans, and 2-year-old children by either
allowing or not allowing them to watch as a reward was
hidden among an array of opaque tubes. Participants were
then given the opportunity to look into the tubes before
choosing. All three species responded diVerentially across
conditions by looking into the tubes signiWcantly more
often when they had not witnessed the hiding, thereby dem-
onstrating that they discriminated between their own past
states of seeing versus not seeing. Call (2005) replicated
this Wnding and extended it to bonobos and gorillas, and
Hampton et al. (2004) found the same eVect in rhesus
macaques. In contrast, capuchin monkeys performing an
equivalent task looked into the tubes in a high proportion of
trials, even when they could see which tube was baited
because the tubes were transparent (Paukner et al. 2006).
Dogs also did not discriminate between conditions in which
they witnessed or did not witness food being hidden,
although their response pattern was to rarely search in
either case (Bräuer et al. 2004).
In the current study, we sought to extend what is known
about chimpanzees’ abilities regarding their own visual expe-
riences. We used a variation on Call and Carpenter’s (2001)
tubes paradigm described above to investigate chimpanzees’
understanding of what they would or would not be able to see
from diVerent visual perspectives.1 SpeciWcally, we asked if
chimpanzees could adopt the correct visual perspective
within an enclosure to gain visual access to occluded food.
Our primary goal was to determine just how reWned is chim-
panzees’ appreciation of where one must be in physical rela-
tion to occluded objects in order to see them. Our task
involved presenting chimpanzees with a collection of open
containers, one of which contained a hidden food item.
Before making a choice, our subjects had the opportunity to
look into the openings in the containers to locate the food.
We used a variety of diVerent container types, each of which
provided visual access to its interior from a unique viewing
angle. Subjects had to recognize which of a number of possi-
ble visual perspectives within their enclosure would be the
appropriate one in any given trial, depending on the type of
container used. Thus, unlike Call and Carpenter’s (2001)
task, in which there was only one response subjects needed
to make to see the food (crouching downward to look into the
tubes in front of them), our task directly tested chimpanzees’
ability to compute visual angles. A secondary goal was to
replicate Call and Carpenter’s (2001) Wnding that chimpan-
zees discriminated between situations in which they had or
1 When we talk about chimpanzees’ understanding of “what” they
would be able to see from a diVerent perspective, we mean more pre-
cisely their understanding of whether or not they would be able to see
something (i.e., Level 1 perspective taking). This was also Hare et al.’s
(2000) meaning: knowing what others could or could not see meant
knowing whether others could or could not see something.123
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chimpanzees to observe the hiding in half the trials but
blocked their view in the other half. Based on the results of
past research, we expected subjects to look into the contain-
ers before choosing more often when they had not witnessed
the experimenter hide the food.
Our project diVered from earlier perspective taking stud-
ies employing visual occluders in two important respects.
First, we required chimpanzees to demonstrate their under-
standing of visual perspective in the absence of any gaze
cues. In previous studies involving gaze following around
barriers (e.g., Bräuer et al. 2005; Tomasello et al. 1999),
subjects could use the imaginary line of sight of the experi-
menter to help them determine where to move to see the
gazed-at object. In contrast, our task demanded that sub-
jects have a more general appreciation of what can or can-
not be seen from where, because there were no gaze cues
present for them to make use of. Second, in Tomasello et al.
(1999) and Bräuer et al. (2005), subjects were judged as
having made the correct response if they moved to the cor-
rect position at any point within a trial lasting 1 min,
regardless of where they had moved before that point. In
the current study, we considered subjects to have responded
correctly only if the very Wrst response they made in an
attempt to see the hidden food was the appropriate one for
the particular type of container used. By requiring subjects
to adopt the correct visual perspective as their initial
response, we could be more conWdent that they were antic-
ipating, in advance of moving, which perspective would
gain them visual access to the occluded food.
Experiment 1: perspective-shifting test
We Wrst gave subjects a tubes task similar to that used by Call
and Carpenter (2001), both to introduce them to the paradigm
of searching for food in open containers and also to see if we
could replicate the basic Wnding that chimpanzees looked
more often in unseen than in seen trials. The perspective-
shifting test that followed constituted the main experimental
component. In those trials we tested whether chimpanzees
anticipated the speciWc perspectives they needed to adopt to
see into various types of containers. Before and after the per-
spective-shifting test, we also measured baseline levels of
responding when food was hidden in completely closed,
opaque containers. This allowed us to compare chimpanzees’
frequency of looking in the perspective-shifting test with
their frequency of looking when the food was not potentially
visible from any viewing angle. If the chimpanzees were
making deliberate attempts to see the food when they did not
know its location in the perspective-shifting test, we would
expect to Wnd diVerential looking across seen and unseen
trials in that test but not in the baseline sessions.
Method
Subjects
Ten chimpanzees housed socially at the Wolfgang
Köhler Primate Research Center (WKPRC) in Leipzig,
Germany participated: two males and eight females, all
captive-born, Wve hand-reared and Wve mother-reared,
ranging from 5 to 30 years old at the start of the study
(mean age = 13 years). All subjects had taken part in a
variety of social and physical cognition experiments,
with seven participating in a study 6 years earlier that
involved searching in tubes for hidden food (Call 2005).
Subjects were not food deprived and had access to water
ad libitum.
Design
Subjects received, in succession, 12 pretest baseline trials,
18 tubes trials, 36 perspective-shifting trials, and 12 post-
test baseline trials. In half the trials subjects witnessed the
baiting of the containers (seen condition) and in half their
view was blocked (unseen condition).2 In the perspective-
shifting test, each of the three container types was used the
same number of times in each condition. Baiting condition,
food location, and container type were randomized with the
following constraints: (1) there could not be more than four
consecutive seen or unseen trials, (2) the food could not be
in the same location for more than three consecutive trials,
and (3) in the perspective-shifting test the same container
type could not be used for more than two consecutive trials.
Subjects received a variable number of trials per session
depending on their availability and willingness to partici-
pate (mode number of trials per session was 12 for the base-
line, 9 for the tubes trials, and 18 for the perspective-
shifting test).
Experimental set-up
Testing took place in two diVerent testing rooms, each hav-
ing a three-sided windowed booth (105 cm wide, 90 cm
deep) set in between two adjoining enclosures (Fig. 1). The
windows extended to 202 cm above Xoor level in one test-
ing room and 272 cm in the other. The bottom section of
the windows on the left and right sides of the booth com-
prised a 2.5-cm-thick Plexiglas panel (68 £ 49 cm) inside a
metal frame. A table (80 £ 52 cm) with a sliding section on
top (80 £ 35 cm) was mounted below one of these panels,
allowing the containers to be slid within or out of subjects’
2 The Wrst two subjects received only six unseen (and no seen) pretest
baseline trials because we decided only after testing them to include
seen trials in the baseline.123
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through one of three holes (diameter = 3.5 cm) spaced
evenly across the bottom of the panel. This location was
labeled the home window.
Stimuli
Baseline containers
Three identical opaque plastic boxes (16 £ 11.5 £ 4.5 cm)
were used for the pre- and post-test baseline trials. The
boxes had lids and were completely closed, so they did not
allow visual access to the food from any viewing angle.
Subjects had become familiar with such boxes in previous
object-choice studies.
Tubes
For the tubes task, we used three identical rectangular tubes
constructed of 1-cm-thick gray plastic (30 cm long with a 5
£ 5 cm opening), similar to those used by Call and Carpen-
ter (2001). The tubes were baited through an opening at the
back, and duct tape occluded the top half of the front open-
ing of each tube so that subjects had to clearly lower their
head to see inside.
Perspective-shifting test containers
There were three container types (shown in Fig. 2) for
the perspective-shifting test: (a) cylindrical containers
open only at the top and painted white inside for better
visibility, (b) triangular containers open only at the sides,
and (c) trapezoidal containers open only at the back. The
cylinders were cut from gray PVC piping and the trian-
gles and trapezoids were constructed from 1-cm-thick
gray plastic. We had three of each type of container, and
in any given trial we always used three identical contain-
ers. The same containers were used for seen and unseen
trials so that we could directly compare across condi-
tions. Cylinders could only be seen into from above,




Subjects were Wrst familiarized with the properties of the
tubes and the perspective-shifting test containers. The
containers were placed in a pile on the Xoor of an enclosure,
Fig. 1 Testing room. Note that the left and right sides of the booth,
fanned outward in this diagram to make them visible, are actually at















Fig. 2 Perspective-shifting test 
containers as viewed from the 
home window and also, for each 
container type, from the perspec-
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10–20 min. After they completed the tubes task subjects
were again given exclusive access to the perspective-shifting
test containers for 10–20 min to refresh their memories. All
subjects showed interest in the containers by inspecting, biting,
licking, sniYng, carrying, hitting, or throwing them. Interest
waned quickly, however, and when the test began subjects
no longer appeared to consider the containers to be interesting
objects in their own right. The familiarization phase ensured
that subjects knew where the openings in the diVerent types
of containers were located. Once they had this knowledge, we
could then present them with the containers in position on the
platform and see if they recognized speciWcally where they
had to position themselves to see into the various openings.
Baseline, tubes, and perspective-shifting test trials
The same basic procedure was used for all trials. The
experimenter (E) sat facing the home window and placed
three identical containers onto the table, spaced evenly
apart. She showed subjects that the containers were empty
and then placed a food item into one of them. In seen trials
subjects were allowed to watch as E did so, and they thus
saw which container she baited. However, in unseen trials,
E Wrst blocked subjects’ view by positioning opaque
screens at the home and center windows of the booth (the
screen at the home window had a lip on top that also
obstructed subjects’ view from above). If subjects moved
to the opposite window during baiting or tried to see
around the screens, E blocked the view of the containers
with her body and waited until the subject moved away
before proceeding. Thus, in unseen trials, subjects could
only know where the food was located by waiting until E
was Wnished the baiting process and then moving to the
appropriate location for the containers used in any given
trial.
When baiting was complete, E exited the booth and
removed the screens in unseen trials (the screen at the cen-
ter window Wrst and then the screen at the home window, in
quick succession). So as not to inhibit subjects’ move-
ments, she sat or stood with her back to the booth for 20 s
(60 s in baseline trials). She then re-entered the booth and
slid the containers forward so subjects could choose. When
subjects chose correctly E gave them the food inside the
container. Otherwise, E showed them that the container was
empty and then removed the food from the correct con-
tainer and returned it to a nearby bucket.
Measures and coding
There were three dependent measures: choice of container,
Wrst look, and Wrst move. Choice was coded live and look-
ing and moving were coded from videotapes.
First look
Of most interest in the perspective-shifting test was the Wrst
look measure, deWned as the very Wrst attempt subjects
made to look into the containers. Three possible responses
were coded:
UP: Subjects moved upward and looked down at the
containers from above. Doing so provided visual access
into the cylinders but was ineVective for the other contain-
ers. Subjects’ head had to reach or exceed the height of the
metal frame around the Plexiglas panel (see Fig. 1). An UP
look could also occur at the center or opposite window, but
only if it was not preceded by a look through the lower por-
tion of that window (i.e., below the level of the metal frame).
SIDE: Subjects clearly examined the containers from the
side by moving close to the center window and lowering
their head. Alternatively, at the home window, they could
lean far and low to one side (i.e., into the bottom left or
right corner of the window) and examine the sides of the
containers from that position. In this case, their head had to
reach the edge of the metal frame and their chin had to
reach the bottom of the frame for a SIDE look to be coded.
OPPOSITE: Subjects clearly examined the backs of the
containers, either by moving to the opposite window or to
the extreme far end of the center window. In the latter case
their head had to reach the far edge of the center window
frame. Note that to get from the home to the opposite win-
dow subjects obviously had to move past the center win-
dow. This was only counted as a SIDE response if subjects
clearly hesitated or lowered their head to examine the con-
tainers before continuing on to the opposite window.
For all three responses, subjects had to come close to the
window (within about half a meter) for a look to be scored.
Coding began at the moment the food was potentially visi-
ble. In the seen trials this was when E had completed the
baiting and removed her hand from the opening in the con-
tainer. In unseen trials, our use of screens to block subjects’
view caused the food to become potentially visible at
slightly diVerent times for each type of container. For trape-
zoids, it was as soon as E moved out of the booth so that
she no longer blocked subjects’ view through the opposite
window; for triangles, it was when E next removed the
screen from the center window; and for cylinders, it was
when E Wnally removed the screen from the home window
(recall that this screen had a lip blocking subjects’ view
from above). Note that we could not begin coding while all
screens were still in place because they obscured our view
of the subjects’ faces, making it often impossible to tell if
they were attempting to look into the containers. On the
other hand, if we waited until all screens were removed we
might have missed looks that occurred in the interim (e.g.,
when subjects ran over to the opposite window to look into
the trapezoids after E had exited the booth but had not yet123
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coding as soon as the food was potentially visible was thus
a compromise between these two options. For tubes trials,
we also coded looks in seen trials during the couple of sec-
onds it took E to perform the baiting. This was because sub-
jects could look into the tubes while E deposited the grape
into the opposite end. Looking during baiting in seen trials
was not an issue with the other containers because subjects
could not see the food until E had removed her hand.
In some cases (19% of trials) subjects had already
adopted the UP, SIDE or OPPOSITE perspective before
coding began, for example because they had moved there as
E was leaving the booth or removing the occluding screens.
In these cases, if subjects then clearly examined the con-
tainers from that perspective once coding began, this was
coded as the Wrst look. In addition to the Wrst look, we also
noted whether subjects looked from any other perspective
throughout the remainder of the trial.
First move
The looking measure was somewhat conservative because
subjects had to not just move to the correct location but also
clearly examine the containers. Instances in which subjects
quickly glanced at the containers from the incorrect per-
spective could have therefore been missed. To address this,
we also scored where subjects Wrst moved irrespective of
whether or not they looked. The same criteria were used as
for Wrst looks except that subjects did not have to approach
the window nor visually examine the containers. However,
for moves that occurred within the conWnes of the home
window (i.e., UP moves that did not extend beyond the top
of the metal frame and SIDE moves into the lower left or
right corner of the window) the subject had to at least be
oriented forward. As with the Wrst look measure, we began
coding from the moment the food was potentially visible to
the chimpanzee. Because it was possible to see where
subjects were moving even with all screens in place, we also
did a second coding beginning from the moment E Wnished
the baiting and before she had removed any of the screens.
Because looks were irrelevant for this measure, if sub-
jects had already adopted the UP, SIDE or OPPOSITE per-
spective before coding began then the next location they
moved to was coded as the Wrst move. (Note that this meant
that in some trials a look could be coded when a move had
not been coded.) A few locations within the enclosures
were considered to be neutral, in the sense that subjects
could not see the food inside the containers from those
locations. For example, subjects occasionally waited out
the trial in the doorway between the two enclosures or on a
raised bench at the back wall. These locations were counted
as equivalent to the home position and were not coded as
moves.
Reliability
An independent coder naïve to the hypotheses of the study
coded 20% of test and baseline trials for choice of con-
tainer, looking versus not looking, number of diVerent
kinds of look (none, one, or more than one kind), Wrst look,
and Wrst move. Kappas were 1.00, 0.80, 0.76, 0.84 and
0.77, respectively (all P’s · 0.001). A second naïve coder
judged a third of tubes trials for subjects’ choice and
whether or not they looked. Kappas were 1.00 and 0.65,3
respectively (both P’s · 0.003). All trials were chosen ran-
domly with the constraint that half be seen and half unseen.
Analysis
All statistical tests were non-parametric and reported P val-
ues are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. One-tailed tests
were used only when results from previous research
allowed strong directional predictions.
Results
Tubes task
The tubes task conWrmed that our subjects understood the
task of searching in containers for hidden food and were
motivated to do so. Looking was in fact at ceiling levels,
with subjects looking into the tubes in 100% of unseen tri-
als and an average of 89% of seen trials. This diVerence,
although not large, was statistically signiWcant in a one-
tailed exact Wilcoxon test (T+ = 15.00, n = 5 [5 ties],
P = 0.031).
Perspective-shifting test
As Fig. 3 shows, in the baseline sessions looking was com-
parable across seen and unseen trials (pretest: T+ = 11.00,
n = 6 [2 ties], P = 0.88; post-test: T+ = 29.00, n = 9 [1 tie],
P = 0.49).4 In the perspective-shifting test trials, however,
subjects looked signiWcantly more often in unseen than in
3 The main and reliability coders agreed on 58/60 of trials, but the kap-
pa was only moderate because responses were heavily skewed in one
direction (i.e., there was a positive looking response in almost every
trial).
4 To make the baseline trials equivalent to the perspective-shifting test
trials, we included only the Wrst 20 seconds in the analysis. However,
with the entire 60 seconds of each baseline trial included there were
still no signiWcant diVerences in looking between seen and unseen tri-
als (pretest: T+ = 9.00, n = 5 [3 ties], P = 0.88; post-test: T+ = 25.00,
n = 8 [2 ties], P = 0.38). Also note that only eight subjects were includ-
ed in the pretest comparison of seen and unseen trials because two sub-
jects did not receive the seen trials, as mentioned in footnote 2.123
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was eVective in locating the food: in unseen trials, subjects
chose correctly signiWcantly more often than the chance
proportion (0.33) when they looked into the containers
(T+ = 55.00, n = 10 [0 ties], P = 0.002), whereas their per-
formance was at chance when they did not look
(T+ = 26.00, n = 8 [0 ties], P = 0.31). In the seen trials, sub-
jects performed above chance whether they looked or not
(for both analyses, T+ = 55.00, n = 10 [0 ties], P = 0.002).
Overall, subjects looked far less often than they had in the
tubes trials, likely because the eVort required to look into
the perspective-shifting test containers was greater.
First look
Subjects’ performance in the perspective-shifting test trials
demonstrated that they anticipated the correct visual per-
spective for seeing into the diVerent containers. As Fig. 4
shows, subjects’ Wrst look was almost always the correct
one for the type of container used. For unseen trials only,
exact Friedman tests for each container type were all statis-
tically signiWcant (Fr ¸ 10.41, df = 2, n = 10, P · 0.003 in
all cases). Pairwise tests revealed that the correct response
for each container type occurred Wrst in a signiWcantly
greater proportion of trials than either of the two incorrect
responses (Wilcoxon exact tests: T+ ¸ 43.00, n ¸ 9
[ties · 1], P · 0.016 in all cases), whereas there were no
signiWcant diVerences in frequency of the two incorrect
responses (T+ · 3.00, n · 2 [ties ¸ 8], P ¸ 0.50 in all
cases). Additionally, when subjects did look, they rarely
looked from more than one diVerent perspective. Of the 184
total test trials in which subjects looked, there were only 11
in which they performed more than one type of look.
For seen trials only, the pattern of responding was gener-
ally the same, except that the Friedman test was not signiW-
cant for the cylinders (cylinders: Fr = 4.57, P = 0.14;
triangles: Fr = 16.20, P < 0.001; trapezoids: Fr = 12.00,
P = 0.004; df = 2, n = 10 in all cases). For the triangles and
trapezoids, the correct perspective was adopted in a signiW-
cantly greater proportion of trials than either of the two
incorrect perspectives (T+ ¸ 21.00, n ¸ 6 [ties · 4],
P · 0.031 in all cases), and the two incorrect responses
were not signiWcantly diVerent (T+ · 1.50, n · 2 [ties ¸ 8],
P = 1.00 in both cases). In the baseline trials, there were no
signiWcant diVerences in the incidence of diVerent types of
response. Collapsing across the pre- and post-test and
across the seen and unseen conditions (all of which were
not signiWcantly diVerent from one another: all
P’s ¸ 0.125), subjects looked from the UP, SIDE and
OPPOSITE perspectives in the same average proportion of
trials (Fr = 4.34, df = 2, n = 10, P = 0.12).
To investigate whether subjects learned over time to per-
form the correct response for each type of container, we
compared their performance in the Wrst versus the second
half of trials in both the seen and unseen conditions. There
was no detectable sign of learning, as subjects looked just
as often in early trials as in later ones (seen: T+ = 31.50;
n = 10 [0 ties], P = 0.71; unseen: T+ = 23.00, n = 8 [2 ties],
P = 0.52). And when subjects did look, it was from the cor-
rect perspective just as often in the Wrst half as in the second
half of trials (seen: T+ = 6.00; n = 3 [5 ties], P = 0.25;
unseen: T+ = 18.00, n = 6 [4 ties], P = 0.16). Further, chim-
panzees did not succeed by simply learning the correct
responses during seen trials and then transferring them over
to the unseen trials. Of the 30 trials in which subjects
Fig. 3 Mean proportion of trials (§SE) in which subjects attempted to
look into the containers in seen versus unseen trials, across the pretest
baseline (n = 8), perspective-shifting test (n = 10), and post-test base-






















































Fig. 4 Mean proportion of trials (§SE) in which subjects’ Wrst look
was from the UP, SIDE, or OPPOSITE (OPP) perspective across all
three container types, in both the a seen baiting and b unseen baiting
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First look123
324 Anim Cogn (2009) 12:317–331experienced a given container for the very Wrst time, 13
were unseen trials. Examining just those trials, we found
that chimpanzees visually searched for the food in 8 of
them, and in every case their Wrst look was from the correct
perspective.
First move
First, we examined the Wrst move chimpanzees made after
the food became potentially visible. The results were con-
sistent with the Wrst look measure (see Fig. 5). In unseen
trials, subjects’ Wrst move was most often the correct one
(Fr ¸ 9.92, df = 2, n = 10, P · 0.005 in all cases). And
again, the correct response occurred more often than either
of the two incorrect responses (T+ ¸ 26.50, n ¸ 7
[ties · 3], P · 0.047 in all cases), while the two incorrect
responses occurred with equal frequency (T+ · 12.50,
n · 5 [ties ¸ 5], P ¸ 0.25 in all cases). Moving in seen tri-
als was less systematic than in unseen trials, as only the
Friedman test for the triangles reached signiWcance (cylin-
ders: Fr = 1.13, P = 0.60; triangles: Fr = 11.21, P = 0.002;
trapezoids: Fr = 4.79, P = 0.11; df = 2, n = 10 in all cases).
In the triangles condition, the SIDE versus UP comparison
was signiWcantly diVerent (T+ = 36.00, n = 8 [2 ties],
P = 0.008) but the other two paired comparisons were not
(T+ · 21.00, n · 7 [ties ¸ 3], P ¸ 0.125 in both cases).
These results make sense if subjects were moving in seen
trials not in an attempt to Wnd the food but for other reasons
such as boredom or frustration at the long wait. Finally, we
considered the possibility that coding from the moment the
food became visible in unseen trials could have biased the
moving results, because subjects might have simply moved
to a window at which a screen was currently being
removed. To address this possibility, we reran the analyses
using our second coding that began from the moment E
Wnished the baiting, before any screens were removed. The
pattern of results did not change (Fr ¸ 9.75, df = 2, n = 10,
P · 0.007 in all cases).
Discussion
In experiment 1, subjects searched more often when they
had not seen the baiting, but only when there was a real
possibility of seeing the food (i.e., when the containers had
openings in them). Searching was systematic: subjects’
most common response by far was to adopt the correct
viewing perspective for the particular containers used, look
into the containers, and then return to the home window to
choose a container. The results were robust across diVerent
measures (Wrst look or Wrst move) and across diVerent start-
ing points for coding (from the moment the food was poten-
tially visible, or from the moment E Wnished baiting). In the
tubes trials, looking was at ceiling levels and was much
higher than in Call and Carpenter (2001). This can be
explained by changes we made to their procedure to make it
more comparable to our perspective-shifting test. First, our
tubes were 50 cm above Xoor level, making them easier to
look into than Call and Carpenter’s (2001) tubes, which
were at a height of 35 cm. Second, we had a 20-s delay
between baiting and letting subjects choose, whereas Call
and Carpenter (2001) had a 5-s delay or no delay at all. Our
subjects, therefore, had far more time to look into the tubes
than theirs, and they may have done so because they
became bored or forgot where the food was, or simply to
double-check since no other response was possible at that
time. If we exclude any looks that happened beyond the
Wrst 5 s, subjects looked, on average, in 60% of seen trials
and 72% of unseen trials (T+ = 29.50, n = 9 [1 tie],
P = 0.22, one-tailed), which is more similar to Call and
Carpenter’s 5-s delay condition (2001, experiment 1) in
which subjects looked in approximately 52% of seen trials
and 87% of unseen trials. In our perspective-shifting test,
looking frequency was lower than in both our own and Call
and Carpenter’s (2001) tubes test, probably owing to the
greater eVort required to search in the cylinders, triangles
and trapezoids than in the tubes.
Our Wndings strongly suggest that our subjects antici-
pated which visual perspectives would be eVective in gain-
ing visual access to the hidden food and which would
not, depending on the type of container. We considered,
Fig. 5 Mean proportion of trials (§SE) in which subjects’ Wrst move
(independent of looking) was UP, SIDE, or OPPOSITE (OPP) across
all three container types, in both the a seen baiting and b unseen baiting

































































Anim Cogn (2009) 12:317–331 325however, an alternative explanation. When subjects were
seated at the home window, the openings in the cylinders
and triangles were visible to them, and the shape of the
trapezoids was suggestive of an opening at the back. Sub-
jects could have therefore solved our task by aligning them-
selves with visible openings when they knew food to be
hidden somewhere among an array of containers. In other
words, they could have simply responded to a general ten-
dency to look into visible openings. We tested this alterna-
tive explanation in experiment 2.
Experiment 2: UP versus OPPOSITE
In this experiment, we examined whether subjects preferred
to search in a visible opening for hidden food when there
was also a non-visible opening available. Subjects chose
between two identical cylinders open on one end. One cyl-
inder was oriented vertically and the other was oriented
horizontally with its open end turned away from subjects. If
chimpanzees simply searched in visible openings, they
should look more often into the vertical cylinder. Other-
wise, they should look into both cylinders with equal fre-
quency. Note that if subjects looked into one cylinder and
did not Wnd the food, they could infer by exclusion that it
must be in the other cylinder, and so looking in either cylin-
der was an eVective response. Call (2004) and Call and Car-
penter (2001) found that some of their chimpanzees were
capable of making such inferences by exclusion.
Method
Subjects
The same ten chimpanzees as in experiment 1 participated.
Five months elapsed between experiments.
Design
Each subject had 48 trials. The reward in the Wrst 32 trials
was a grape or a small paper cup of yoghurt. Because of
waning motivation, in the last 16 trials we used a more
desirable reward: a cup of yoghurt perched atop a banana
slice and surrounded by several grapes (the cornucopia tri-
als). Within each block of 16 trials, there were equal num-
bers of seen and unseen trials, the visible opening was on
the right or left an equal number of times, and the food was
on the right or left an equal number of times. The various
combinations of these variables were presented in random
order with the constraint that none of the factors could
repeat for more than three consecutive trials. Subjects were
given a variable number of trials per session (mode = 8).
Experimental set-up
The set-up was as for experiment 1 except that the opposite
window was occluded during baiting and the center win-
dow remained occluded throughout the entire trial.
Stimuli
Containers were two identical 7.5-cm diameter cylinders
similar to those used in experiment 1 except that they were
16.5 cm in height and had a removable cap on one end. We
used slightly taller cylinders than for experiment 1 because
we wanted the eVort of moving up to look into them from
above to be comparable to the eVort of moving over to the
opposite window to look into them from the other end.
A plastic rectangle attached to the side of each cylinder
kept it from rolling when horizontal.
Procedure
The procedure was as in experiment 1 with two changes:
(1) In seen trials, to minimize the possibility that subjects
would simply look into openings where they saw food
disappear a moment before, we baited the cylinders
through the end opposite the opening. E removed the cap
from the bottom of the vertical cylinder or the front of the
horizontal cylinder, placed the food inside, and then
replaced the cap; and (2) We shortened the trials to 10 s
because 20 s had proven to be unnecessarily long in
experiment 1 (subjects typically responded within the Wrst
few seconds).
Measures and coding
Dependent measures were as for experiment 1, except
that Wrst moves were no longer coded. This measure was
now unnecessary because subjects had to climb above the
level of the metal frame (because the cylinders were
taller) or move all the way over to the opposite window
(because the center window was occluded) to see into the
containers. These UP and OPPOSITE responses, respec-
tively, were almost invariably accompanied by extremely
clear attempts to look into the containers, so that Wrst
looks and Wrst moves amounted to essentially the same
measure.
Reliability
A naïve coder blind to hypotheses and experimental condi-
tion coded 20% of randomly chosen seen and unseen trials
for choice, looking versus not looking, number of diVerent
looks, and Wrst look. Kappas were 1.00, 0.90, 0.89, and
0.90, respectively (all P’s · 0.001).123
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As in experiment 1, subjects looked signiWcantly more
often in unseen than in seen trials (T+ = 45.00, n = 9 [1 tie],
P = 0.004), and they chose correctly signiWcantly more
often than the chance probability (0.50) in unseen trials
only when they looked (looked: T+ = 45.00, n = 9 [0 ties],
P = 0.004; did not look: T+ = 35.50, n = 10 [0 ties],
P = 0.45). Overall, looking frequency was lower than in
experiment 1, possibly because looking required more
eVort. Additionally, there were only two containers in this
experiment, so subjects had a 50% chance of guessing cor-
rectly without looking. The greater eVort of looking, com-
bined with the lower cost of not looking, may have caused
reduced motivation to search. To see if the reward’s desir-
ability made a diVerence, we compared looking in the Wrst
32 trials (grape/yoghurt reward) with the last 16 trials (cor-
nucopia reward). Subjects looked in a signiWcantly greater
proportion of cornucopia trials than grape/yoghurt trials in
the unseen condition (T+ = 34.50, n = 8 [2 ties], P = 0.023)
and results approached signiWcance in the seen condition
(T+ = 15.00, n = 5 [5 ties], P = 0.063). Increasing the desir-
ability of the reward thus boosted subjects’ motivation to
search, especially when they did not know the reward’s
location.
Most important was whether subjects showed evidence
of preferring the visible to the non-visible opening. In the
seen and unseen conditions, subjects moved OPPOSITE
just as often as UP (seen: T+ = 6.00, n = 4 [6 ties], P = 1.00;
unseen: T+ = 34.00, n = 9 [1 tie], P = 0.20). Thus, there was
no clear evidence that subjects preferred to look into a visi-
ble opening when looking into a non-visible one was just as
eVective (Fig. 6). Our subjects’ success in experiment 1
therefore cannot be explained by a general tendency for
chimpanzees to selectively search in visible openings for
hidden food. More convincing evidence, however, would
be if subjects actually demonstrated a preference for non-
visible over visible openings in some situations. We tested
this in experiment 3. 
Experiment 3: UP versus DOWN
In this experiment, we tested whether subjects would prefer
non-visible openings to visible ones when looking into the
non-visible ones was the less eVortful response. If so, this
would provide stronger evidence against the hypothesis
that chimpanzees simply look into the Wrst visible opening
they see when searching for food. We presented chimpan-
zees with a situation in which both visible and non-visible
openings were present at the same time, as in experiment 2.
In this case, however, the non-visible openings required far
less eVort to look into than the visible ones. To create
visible and non-visible openings, we stood cylinders open
on both ends on top of a raised transparent platform. Sub-
jects could climb upward to look into the visible openings
at the top of the cylinders, or they could crouch downward
to look into the non-visible openings at the bottom.
Because apparent lessened motivation to search in experi-
ment 2 may have been partly caused by having only two
containers, for this experiment we increased the number of
containers used in each trial to four.
Method
Subjects
Nine of the same ten chimpanzees participated (one adult
female failed the pretest training criterion). Three months
elapsed between experiments 2 and 3.
Design
Subjects received a variable number of training sessions
as required and then 24 test trials across two sessions (all
unseen). At the beginning of each test session subjects
were given two refresher trials exactly like the training
trials.
Experimental set-up
The set-up was similar to the earlier one, with the following
changes: (1) The door between the enclosures was closed;
(2) Because there were four containers, we replaced the
three-holed Plexiglas panel with a steel mesh panel through
which subjects could poke their Wngers to choose a con-
tainer; (3) A third testing room with a diVerent window
height (192 cm) was also used; and (4) Instead of placing
containers directly onto the table, we placed them onto a
transparent, 1/2-cm-thick Plexiglas platform (75 £ 30 cm)
that stood on top of the table and was 8–10 cm high,
depending on the height of the subject.
Fig. 6 Mean proportion of trials (§SE) in which subjects’ Wrst look
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Training cups
For training we used four white opaque plastic drinking
cups, 13 cm tall with an 8-cm diameter opening.
Test containers
We again used 7.5-cm diameter cylinders similar to those
in experiments 1 and 2, but with diVerent heights. There
were three identical tall cylinders (16.5–23.5 cm high,
depending on the height of the window) and three identical
short cylinders (11 cm high). The tall cylinders were open
on both ends but the short cylinders were only open on the
bottom.
Procedure
In experiments 1 and 2, subjects had gained experience
climbing upward to look into containers from above (the
UP response), but they had never encountered a raised
transparent platform that provided visual access from
underneath. Thus, we needed to be sure that subjects could
also crouch downward to look into containers from below
(the DOWN response). Once we were conWdent they
had both responses in their repertoire we could present
subjects with the test, in which there were both visible
and non-visible openings present at the same time.
Pretraining
Just before training, E showed subjects that the platform
was transparent by holding it vertically in front of her face
and also holding up a grape and an empty cup behind it
(and she repeated this after the Wrst two training trials).
E then gave subjects two warm-up trials in which she
placed four cups onto the platform, all upright in one trial
and all upside-down in the other, with order determined
randomly. She put a grape into one of the cups as the sub-
ject watched and then slid the table forward so the subject
could choose.
Training
E showed subjects that all four cups were empty and posi-
tioned a screen to block their view. She positioned the cups
all upright or all upside-down in a row, hid a grape in one
of them, and removed the screen. E waited until the subject
made the appropriate response (UP for upright cups and
DOWN for upside-down cups) or for 2 min, whichever
came Wrst. She then slid the table forward so the subject
could choose.
Training was administered in blocks of four trials.
Within each block, the cups were upright in two trials and
upside-down in two trials and the food was at each location
once, with order determined randomly. The subject had to
perform the appropriate response (not necessarily Wrst) in
all four trials to proceed to testing; otherwise another block
was run. After each block, if subjects had not reached crite-
rion then E provided training tailored to individual needs.
For subjects who were not moving downward, she tilted the
platform upward until the grape was visible from below.
For subjects who were not moving upward, she tilted the
cups forward until the grape was visible from above. If sub-
jects continued having trouble E demonstrated the
responses. One or two blocks a day were administered until
subjects reached criterion. Three subjects did so within two
blocks, three within four blocks, and three within Wve
blocks. One subject did not reach criterion within six
blocks (she would not move upward) and was therefore
dropped from the experiment. In summary, our goal for
training was to ensure that subjects could make both types
of response, UP and DOWN, so that they could choose
between these responses in the test trials.
Test trials
For the test, there were again four cylinders on the transpar-
ent platform in each trial. We ran two conditions: (1) the
three-tall condition included three tall cylinders plus one
short one, and (2) the three-short condition included three
short cylinders plus one tall one. The fourth, odd cylinder
was always positioned on the far left or right side of the
others. It was never baited and subjects knew this, for rea-
sons that will become clear below. The height of the three
identical cylinders (tall or short), the position of the fourth
cylinder (left or right), and the location of the food (left,
right or center) were all counterbalanced and randomly
ordered, with the stipulation that none of these variables
could repeat for more than three consecutive trials.
We included the fourth, odd cylinder in the array so that
we could run the strongest test we could think of for
whether chimpanzees prefer to look into visible openings.
Namely, if there were three non-visible openings and one
visible opening present at the same time and the visible
opening had clearly not been baited (i.e., the three-short
condition), would subjects nevertheless prefer the visible
opening to the non-visible ones? If they did so, this would
indicate an undeniable preference for visible openings.
Given the results of experiment 2, we expected that, in the
three-short condition, subjects would have little trouble
ignoring the visible opening in the tall cylinder. We pre-
dicted that they would instead choose the only eVective
response in that condition, which was to move DOWN and
look into the cylinders from underneath. The three-tall123
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would be eVective in locating the food, was therefore of
more interest to us. In the three-tall condition, subjects
could choose to either climb UP and look into the cylinders
from above or crouch DOWN and look into them from
below. While both responses were eVective, the UP
response required signiWcantly more eVort than the DOWN
response.
The procedure for all trials was as follows. E positioned
the three identical cylinders in a vertical line in the center of
the raised platform, one in front of the other, and let sub-
jects watch as she baited one of them. She also placed the
fourth cylinder onto the platform, apart from the others so it
was clear she did not bait it. Next, E blocked the subject’s
view of the three identical cylinders and positioned them in
a horizontal row across the platform, with the fourth cylin-
der at the far left or far right of the row and still visible to
the subject. (When the fourth cylinder was a tall one, E also
placed a lid on it so that subjects could not look down into it
during this time.) Note that although the subjects saw the
baiting, they did not see the positioning of the containers
and so did not know where the food was located. All trials
were thus unseen. When E had Wnished positioning the con-
tainers she removed the screen blocking the subject’s view
(and the lid from the fourth, tall cylinder, when relevant),
sat for 10 s looking at her stopwatch, and then pushed the
containers within reach. E did not leave the window during
the delay because she was not obstructing subjects’ view by
remaining there, and also because the metal grating made it
diYcult to see the subjects’ faces on video and it was easier
to code the responses live.
Measures and coding
E coded live whether subjects chose the correct container
and also whether they performed either of two responses:
moving UP beyond the level of the metal frame and looking
into the containers from above, or crouching DOWN and
looking into them from below.
Reliability
A naïve coder judged 20% of randomly selected test trials
for container chosen, Wrst look, and whether the subject
looked from more than one perspective. Kappas were 1.00,
0.94, and 0.94, respectively (all P’s · 0.001).
Results and discussion
Looking was at ceiling levels, with every subject looking
into the containers in every trial. It was also very eVective,
as there was only a single trial in which a subject chose
incorrectly. Most interestingly, subjects almost always
crouched downward to look into the containers from
below rather than climbing upward to look into them from
above (Fig. 7), and the diVerence was highly signiWcant
(T+ = 45.00, n = 9 [0 ties], P = 0.004). There were only 11
test trials in 216 in which a subject performed more than
one type of response, either moving UP to look after previ-
ously moving DOWN (2 trials) or moving DOWN to look
after previously moving UP (9 trials).
It is very likely that subjects preferred the DOWN
response because it was the far less eVortful of the two
responses. Supporting this view is the fact that when sub-
jects did climb upward as their Wrst response, it was almost
always (except in two cases) within the Wrst six test trials.
Subjects thus quickly learned that the DOWN response was
less eVortful than the UP response and they came to rely on
this response almost exclusively as time went on. Further-
more, there were only 12 trials in which a subject’s Wrst or
only response was to climb upward. Of these 12 trials, only
two were in the three-short condition, in which looking into
the one visible opening (at the top of the fourth, tall cylin-
der) could not have possibly been eVective in locating the
food because that container was never baited. Thus, as pre-
dicted, we found that subjects did not show a preference for
visible openings. Instead, they clearly preferred to look into
non-visible openings when this was the easier of the two
options. Together with the results of experiment 2, this
Wnding allows us to rule out the possibility that our subjects
succeeded in experiment 1 by acting on a general tendency
to look into visible openings.
General discussion
Chimpanzees visually searched signiWcantly less often
when they had witnessed the hiding of a food reward than
when they had not, replicating Wndings from previous stud-
ies (Call 2005; Call and Carpenter 2001; Hampton et al.
2004). More notably, we found that chimpanzees immedi-
Fig. 7 Mean proportion of trials (§SE) in which subjects’ Wrst look


























Anim Cogn (2009) 12:317–331 329ately recognized which one of various viewing perspectives
they needed to adopt to spy a reward hidden inside a con-
tainer. These results, together with those from studies in
which chimpanzees recognize what other individuals can or
cannot see, suggest that chimpanzees’ abilities regarding
both themselves and others are grounded in a more general
appreciation of visual perspective. It is impossible to know
from this study alone whether chimpanzees’ perspective-
taking abilities involve explicit reasoning of any kind.
However, in the current study, the fact that they often read-
ily left the home window (the only place where food could
be physically accessed) with the clear intention of visually
locating the food before making a choice suggests a delib-
erateness to their responses that goes far beyond any reXex
foraging reaction.
Let us further elaborate on our Wndings and their relation
to tests of chimpanzees’ understanding of visual perspec-
tive in others. In experiment 1, chimpanzees were presented
with a situation in which they could move around an enclo-
sure to visually search for food hidden among three identi-
cal open containers. The correct perspective for seeing into
the containers depended on the location of the openings,
which varied across trials. In an overwhelming proportion
of cases, subjects’ Wrst response was to go immediately to
the appropriate location for gaining visual access to the hid-
den food. Experiments 2 and 3 ruled out the possibility that
our subjects succeeded in experiment 1 because of a gen-
eral tendency to align themselves with visible openings. In
experiment 2 they looked into visible and non-visible open-
ings equally as often when both responses required similar
levels of eVort, and in experiment 3 they even preferred
non-visible openings to visible ones when looking into the
non-visible openings was the easier option. In short, our
subjects demonstrated that they could anticipate the eVect
that speciWc shifts in their own perspective would have on
their ability to see the food. Further, it is important to note
that the chimpanzees did not move in an attempt to acquire
the food. They were quite aware of the fact that the food
could only be acquired at the home window, as evidenced
by their returning to the home window to choose a con-
tainer after they had spotted the food.
One common criticism of visual perspective taking
research with animals is that subjects could solve the tasks
presented to them by simply responding to the observable
behavior of others. For example, instead of understanding
that a social partner with its back turned cannot see them,
chimpanzees might learn from experience that others ori-
ented away from them are typically unresponsive to their
gestures (for an extended and ongoing debate on this issue
see Heyes 1998; Penn and Povinelli 2007; Povinelli and
Vonk 2003, 2004; Tomasello et al. 2003a, b). Our task
involved no social partners, so there were no social cues
available for subjects to make use of. Furthermore, subjects
did not learn (either through previous experience with simi-
lar situations or within the context of this study) where they
needed to position themselves to see into the diVerent types
of containers. From the beginning, they almost invariably
adopted the correct perspective for seeing into the particu-
lar containers they were confronted with in any given trial,
despite the fact that they had never encountered these con-
tainers before the start of this study. While it is true the cyl-
inders were somewhat similar to drinking cups, which
some of the chimpanzees may have had previous experi-
ence with, the triangles and trapezoids were entirely novel
to them, as was the transparent platform in experiment 3.
Their immediate mastering of the task thus suggests that
they were putting their knowledge of the containers’ open-
ings (gained during the familiarization phase) together with
their current perceptions of how the containers were posi-
tioned in front of them to judge where they needed to move.
Although numerous species search for occluded objects and
Wnd appropriate viewing (and approach) angles during their
search (e.g., Chapuis 1987; Regolin et al. 1995; Zucca et al.
2005), chimpanzees were capable of anticipating the appro-
priate viewing angles. Future studies could investigate
whether anticipating correct viewing angles is as wide-
spread an ability in other species as is simply Wnding cor-
rect viewing angles.
We can also be conWdent that the Clever Hans eVect,
whereby animals learn to read subtle, unintentional experi-
menter-given cues to solve the task, was not at work here.
Subjects did not choose the correct container at greater than
chance levels in unseen trials when they failed to look
before choosing. Furthermore, the experimenter could not
have acted diVerently when subjects had not looked than
when they had because (in experiments 1 and 2, at least)
she turned her back to the subject after Wnishing baiting. In
most cases, she therefore did not know until viewing the
videotapes whether or not the subject had looked into the
containers.
We conclude that chimpanzees clearly demonstrated
excellent perspective taking abilities with regard to them-
selves. The precise mechanism by which they were able to
solve our task remains an open question. That they did not
appear to rely on learned associations between conWgura-
tions of cues suggests they were exercising a more general
understanding of visual perspective. Such an understanding
would likely involve a sense of how the relative spatial
relations between oneself and other objects change as one
moves through space or as the objects move. Positive evi-
dence for such capacities in chimpanzees comes from spa-
tial rotation studies, in which subjects see food placed in
one of an array of containers and then must either wait as
the array is rotated (Beran and Minahan 2000; Call 2003),
or walk around the array 180 degrees (HoVman and Beran
2006) before choosing. We should note, however, an123
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our perspective-shifting task. Subjects could arguably solve
the former by tracking the correct container throughout the
movement; however, in our task subjects did not know
which container held the food in the unseen trials and so
they could not track the correct container. Instead, their
responses suggested that they were exercising a more
abstract knowledge of what could be seen from where in
repositioning themselves to spy the reward located inside
the container. Conceivably, our chimpanzees drew upon a
representation of the containers’ features (including the
position of the openings) and the relative spatial positions
of the containers and themselves to anticipate the proper
viewing angle. Although further work is needed to eluci-
date the precise nature of this mechanism, it would cer-
tainly seem to require at least some implicit knowledge of
spatial relationships and visual perspective. Future studies
could be devoted to charting the ability reported here across
various taxa.
It is currently unclear whether chimpanzees might also
use a similar mechanism in judging others’ visual access to
occluded objects. We can only speculate at this point.
Chimpanzees could, for example, project themselves into
the perspective of the other and, putting this together with a
more general understanding of what can be seen from
where, judge when others are or are not able to see some-
thing. Such a process would Wt with the so-called ‘simula-
tion’ view of theory of mind, which suggests that
individuals judge the content of others’ minds and predict
their behavior by using themselves as a model [see, for
example, edited collections by Carruthers and Smith
(1996), Davies and Stone (1995a, b) and also a recent
debate among Saxe (2005), Goldman and Sebanz (2005),
Gordon (2005), Mitchell (2005)]. Simulation theory, at
least in some varieties, predicts that because one’s own per-
ceptual and mental experiences are used to understand oth-
ers’ experiences, abilities regarding the self should
necessarily precede abilities regarding others. On the other
hand, if judging one’s own perceptual access is a funda-
mentally diVerent kind of process altogether from judging
others’ (for example, if the latter relies on simply learning
to associate conWgurations of cues with behavior patterns),
then we might expect to Wnd particular situations in which
chimpanzees show abilities for others but not for the self.
Bräuer et al. (2004), for example, found no evidence that
dogs recognized when they themselves had or had not seen
food being hidden, even though dogs typically perform
well in visual perspective taking tasks involving others
(Miklósi 2008). Note, however, that we do not mean to
conclude on the basis of one study that dogs do not under-
stand anything about their own perceptual states.
So far, the small amount of available evidence for chim-
panzees suggests similar capacities with regard to self and
others, although many more studies looking at abilities
regarding the self are needed. Most useful would be investi-
gations of chimpanzees’ abilities regarding the self and oth-
ers across comparable tasks. For example, a social version
of the task used in the current study could be instructive:
would chimpanzees understand that a social partner who
looked down onto the trapezoids from above could not see
the hidden food, but that one who moved opposite to look
into them from the back could see it? If not, this would sug-
gest that their ability to judge visual access in others is lim-
ited to situations involving simpler kinds of occluding
objects, as in the studies involving barriers described ear-
lier. This would in turn support the view that chimpanzees
may indeed be relying on conWgurations of observable cues
to predict others’ behavior without truly understanding
what others can or cannot see. Future research involving
such direct comparisons of abilities for the self and others
across similar tasks will shed more light on just how much
chimpanzees do or do not understand about both their own
and others’ perceptual and mental experiences.
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